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Abstract—A system relying on the collective behavior of
decision-makers can be vulnerable to a variety of adversarial
attacks. How well can a system operator protect performance
in the face of these risks? We frame this question in the
context of graphical coordination games, where the agents in a
network choose among two conventions and derive benefits from
coordinating neighbors, and system performance is measured in
terms of the agents’ welfare. In this paper, we assess an operator’s
ability to mitigate two types of adversarial attacks - 1) broad
attacks, where the adversary incentivizes all agents in the network
and 2) focused attacks, where the adversary can force a selected
subset of the agents to commit to a prescribed convention. As a
mitigation strategy, the system operator can implement a class of
distributed algorithms that govern the agents’ decision-making
process. Our main contribution characterizes the operator’s
fundamental trade-off between security against worst-case broad
attacks and vulnerability from focused attacks. We show that
this tradeoff significantly improves when the operator selects
a decision-making process at random. Our work highlights
the design challenges a system operator faces in maintaining
resilience of networked distributed systems.
I. INTRODUCTION
Networked distributed systems typically operate without
centralized planning or control, and instead rely on local in-
teractions and communication between the comprising agents.
These systems arise in a variety of engineering applications
such as teams of mobile robots and sensor networks [1]–
[3]. They are also prevalent in social dynamics [4], [5] and
biological populations [6].
The transition from a centralized to a distributed architecture
may leave a system vulnerable to a variety of adversarial
attacks. An adversary may be able to manipulate the decision-
making processes of the agents. Such dynamical perturbations
can potentially lead to unwanted outcomes. For example in so-
cial networks, individual opinions can be shaped from external
information sources, resulting in a polarized society [7], [8].
When feasible, a system operator takes measures to mitigate
adversarial influences. The literature on cyber-physical system
security studies many aspects of this interplay. For instance,
optimal controllers are designed to mitigate denial-of-service,
estimation, and deception attacks [9]–[13].
This paper investigates security measures that a system
operator can take against adversarial influences when the
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underlying system is a graphical coordination game [5], [14],
where agents in a network decide between two choices, x
or y. One may think of these choices as two competing
products, e.g. iPhone vs Android, two conflicting social norms,
or two opposing political parties. Each agent derives a positive
benefit from interactions with coordinating neighbors, and zero
benefits from mis-coordinating ones. The system’s efficiency
is defined by the ratio of total benefits of all agents to the
maximal attainable benefits over all configurations of choices.
The goal of the system operator is to design a local decision-
making rule for each agent in the system so that the emergent
collective behavior optimizes system efficiency. One algorithm
that achieves this goal is known as log-linear learning [15]–
[17]. More formally, the agents follow a “perturbed” best reply
dynamics where the agents’ local objectives are precisely equal
to their local welfare. We seek to address the question of
whether this particular algorithm is robust to adversarial influ-
ences. That is, does this algorithm preserve system efficiency
when the agents’ decision-making processes are manipulated
by an adversary? If not, can the operator alter the agents’ local
objectives to mitigate such attacks?
We consider two adversarial attack models - broad and
focused attacks. In broad attacks, the adversary incentivizes
every agent in the network (hence broad) with a convention,
influencing their decision-making process. This could depict
distributing political ads with the intention of polarizing voters.
In focused attacks, the adversary targets a specific set of agents
in the network, forcing them to commit to x or y. These
targeted, or fixed agents consequently do not update their
choices over time but still influence the decisions of others.
For instance, they could portray loyal consumers of a brand or
product, or staunch supporters of a political party. Fixed agents
and their effects on system performance have been extensively
studied in the context of opinion dynamics and optimization
algorithms [13], [18], [19].
The first contribution of this paper is a characterization
of worst-case risk metrics from both adversarial attacks as a
function of the operator’s algorithm design parameter (Section
III). We define risk in this paper as the system’s distance to
optimal efficiency. By worst-case here we mean the maximum
risk among all connected network topologies subject to any
admissible adversarial attack. Hence, our analysis identifies
the network topologies on which worst-case risks are attained
(Section V). We extend this analysis to randomized operator
strategies (Sections IV, VI).
The second contribution of this paper answers the question
“if the operator succeeds in protecting the system from one
type of attack, how vulnerable does it leave the system to the
other?” We identify a fundamental tradeoff between security
against broad attacks and risks from focused attacks. We then
show randomized operator strategies significantly improves
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the set of attainable risk levels and their associated tradeoffs
(Section IV).
By characterizing this interplay, we contribute to previous
work that studied the impact of adversarial influence in
graphical coordination games [20]–[22]. These works analyze
worst-case damages that can be inflicted by varying degrees
of adversarial sophistication and intelligence in the absence of
a system operator. However, these results were derived only
in specific graph structures, namely ring graphs, whereas our
analysis considers adversarial influence in any graph topology.
II. PRELIMINARIES
A. Graphical coordination games
A graphical coordination game is played between a set of
agents N = {1, . . . , N} over a connected undirected network
G = (N , E) with node set N and edge set E ⊂ N ×N . Agent
i’s set of neighbors is written as Ni = {j : (i, j) ∈ E}. Each
agent i selects a choice ai from its action set Ai = {x, y}.
The choices of all the agents constitutes an action profile
a = (a1, . . . , aN ), and we denote the set of all action profiles
as A = ΠNi=1Ai. The local interaction between two agents
(i, j) ∈ E is based on a 2× 2 matrix game, described by the
payoff matrix V : {x, y}2 → R,
Player j
x y
Player i x 1 + αsys, 1 + αsys 0, 0
y 0, 0 1, 1
(1)
where αsys > 0 is the system payoff gain. It indicates that x is
an inherently superior product over y when users coordinate.
Here, agents would rather coordinate than not, but prefer to
coordinate on x. Agent i’s benefit is the sum of payoffs derived
from playing the game (1) with each of its network neighbors:
Wi(ai, a−i) :=
∑
j∈Ni
V (ai, aj) . (2)
A measure of system welfare defined over A is
W (a) :=
N∑
i=1
Wi(ai, a−i), (3)
which is simply the sum of all agent benefits. The system
efficiency for action profile a ∈ A is defined as
W (a)
maxa′∈AW (a′)
. (4)
For A = {x, y}N , the all-x profile ~x maximizes welfare. This
does not necessarily hold for arbitrary action spaces.
B. Log-linear learning algorithm
Log-linear learning is a distributed stochastic algorithm
governing how players’ decisions evolve over time [14]–[16].
It may be applied to any instance of a game with each player
having a well-defined local utility function Ui : A → R over
a set of action profiles A with an underlying interaction graph
G. That is, agent i’s local utility is a function of its action ai
and actions of its neighbors in G.
Agents update their decisions a(t) ∈ A over discrete time
steps t = 0, 1, . . .. Assume a(0) is arbitrarily determined. For
step t ≥ 1, one agent i is selected uniformly at random from
the population. It updates its action to ai(t) = z ∈ Ai with
probability
exp(βUi(z, a−i(t− 1))∑
z′∈Ai exp(βUi(z
′, a−i(t− 1)) , (5)
where β > 0 is the rationality parameter. All other agents
repeat their previous actions: a−i(t) = a−i(t − 1). For large
values of β, i selects a best-response to the previous actions
of others with high probability, and for values of β near zero,
i randomizes among its actions Ai uniformly at random. This
induces an irreducible Markov chain over the action space
A, with a unique stationary distribution piβ ∈ ∆(A). The
stochastically stable states (SSS) a ∈ A are the action profiles
contained in the support of the stationary distribution in the
high rationality limit: they satisfy pi(a) = limβ→∞ piβ(a) > 0.
Such a limiting distribution exists and is unique [15], [23],
[24]. We write the set of stochastically stable states as
LLL(A, {Ui}i∈N ;G). (6)
For graphical coordination games, the log-linear learning
algorithm specified by the action set A = {x, y}N and
utilities {Wi}i∈N selects the welfare-maximizing profile ~x
as the stochastically stable state irrespective of the graph
topology G. This can be shown using standard potential game
arguments [16] (we provide these details in Section V). That
is, ~x = LLL(A, {Wi}i∈N ;G) for all G ∈ GN , where GN is
the set of all connected undirected graphs on N nodes.
However, if an adversary is able to manipulate the agents’
local decision-making rules, this statement may no longer
hold true. A system operator may be able to alter the agents’
local utility functions with the goal of mitigating the loss of
system efficiency in the presence of adversarial influences.
In particular, we consider the class of local utility functions
{Uαi }i∈N parameterized by α > 0. Specifically, Uαi takes the
same form as the benefit function (2) where αsys is replaced
with a perceived gain α that is under the operator’s control.
We next introduce models of adversarial attacks in graphical
coordination games. We then evaluate the performance of
this class of distributed algorithms in the face of adversarial
attacks.
III. MODELS OF ADVERSARIAL INFLUENCE
In this section, we outline two models of adversarial attacks
in graphical coordination games - broad and focused attacks.
The system operator specifies the local utility functions {Uαi }
that govern the log-linear learning algorithm by selecting the
perceived payoff gain α > 0. Our goal is to assess the
performance of this range of algorithms on two corresponding
worst-case risk metrics, which we define and characterize. We
then identify fundamental tradeoff relations between these two
risk metrics.
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Fig. 1: (Left) An example three-node line network under a broad adversarial attack. The imposter nodes are depicted as the labelled smaller
circles and agents in the network are the bigger circles. The color of each circle indicates the node’s action - green for x, blue for y. In this
example, maximum welfare is maxa∈AW (a) = 4(1+αsys), achieved when all three agents play x. The adversary’s target set S attaches an
x-imposter to node 1 and y-imposters to nodes 2 and 3. For operator gains α ≤ 1
2
, a = (a1, a2, a3) = (x, y, y) is the welfare-minimizing
SSS, i.e. it satisfies a = arg min
a∈LLL(A,α,S;G)
W (a). This gives a risk of Rb(α, S;G) = 1 − 12(1+αsys) . For α > 12 , the welfare-minimizing SSS
is (x, x, x). This gives optimal efficiency, i.e. a risk of 0. (Right) An example of a four node star network under a focused attack where
a subset F of three nodes are targeted to be fixed (squares). Only the center node is unfixed. In this example, the maximum welfare is
maxa∈AF W (a) = 4, achieved when the center plays y. This is because the alternative action (when center plays x) gives the suboptimal
welfare 2(1 + αsys) < 4 due to αsys < 1. For operator gains α < 1, the center node plays y in the SSS. This yields optimal efficiency, i.e.
the risk is Rf(α, F ;G) = 0. For α ≥ 1, the center node plays x, giving a risk of Rf(α, F ;G) = 1 − 1+αsys2 . The methods to calculate
stochastically stable states under both types of attacks follow standard potential game arguments and are detailed in Section V.
A. Broad attacks and worst-case risk metric
We consider a scenario where the system is subject to
broad adversarial attacks. For each agent in the network,
the adversary attaches a single imposter node that acts as
a neighbor that always plays x or y. These nodes are not
members of the network but affect the decision making of
agents that are. Let Sx ⊆ N (Sy) be the set of agents
targeted with an imposter x (y) node. We call the target set
S = (Sx, Sy). Any target set satisfies Sx ∩ Sy = ∅ and
Sx ∪ Sy = N . We call T (G) the set of all possible target
sets S on the graph G. Given α > 0, the agents’ perceived
utilities are
U˜αi (ai, a−i) :=
{
Uαi (ai, a−i) + 1(ai = y) i ∈ Sy
Uαi (ai, a−i) + (1 + α)1(ai = x) i ∈ Sx
.
(7)
In the notation of (6), the set of stochastically stable states is
written LLL(A, {U˜αi }i∈N ;G). However for more specificity,
we will refer to it in this context as LLL(A, α, S;G). The
induced network efficiency is defined as
Jb(α, S;G) :=
mina∈LLL(A,α,S;G)W (a)
maxa′∈AW (a′)
=
mina∈LLL(A,α,S;G)W (a)
(1 + αsys)|E| ,
(8)
which is the ratio of the welfare induced by the welfare-
minimizing SSS to the optimal welfare. The second equality
above is due to the fact that optimal welfare is attained at ~x
(all play x). We re-iterate that the imposter nodes serve only to
modify the stochastically stable states, and do not contribute
to the system welfare W (a) (3). The risk from broad attacks
faced by the system operator in choosing gain α is defined as
Rb(α, S;G) := 1− Jb(α, S;G). (9)
Risk measures the distance from optimal efficiency under
operating gain α. Fig. 1a illustrates an example of a three-
node network subject to a broad adversarial attack. The extent
to which systems are susceptible to broad attacks is captured
by the following definition of worst-case risk.
Definition 1. The worst-case risk to broad attacks is given by
R∗b (α) := max
N≥3
max
G∈GN
max
S∈T (G)
Rb(α, S;G), (10)
The quantity R∗b (α) is the cost metric that the system
operator wishes to reduce given uncertainty of the network
structure and target set.
Theorem 1. Let α > 0. The worst-case broad risk is
R∗b (α) =

1−
(
k
k+1
)(
1
1+αsys
)
if α ∈ Ik, for k = 1, 2, . . .
1− 11+αsys if α ∈
[
1, 32
]
0 if α > 32
(11)
where
Ik :=
(
k − 1
k
,
k
k + 1
]
. (12)
It is a piecewise constant function on half-open intervals
that is monotonically decreasing in α. An illustration is given
in Figure 2a, along with the graphs and target sets that achieve
the worst-case risks. For sufficiently high gains α > 3/2,
the system is safeguarded from any broad adversarial attack,
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Fig. 2: (a) The worst-case risk from broad attacks R∗b (α) (11) is a piecewise constant function defined over countably infinite half-open
intervals. The graphs and their corresponding target set which attain each level of worst-case broad risk are illustrated for α < 1. Here,
the x, y labels indicate the type of imposter influence on the agents (circles) in the network, and the color of the circles depict the action
played in the welfare-minimizing SSS (green=x, blue=y). If α ∈ Ik, k = 1, 2, . . .(recall (12)), the worst-case risk is achieved on a star
graph of k+2 nodes where all nodes but one are targeted with a y imposter. The one leaf node has an x imposter attached, giving a single
miscoordinating link in the network. (b) The worst-case risk from focused attacks R∗f (α) (16). The graphs and their corresponding fixed
sets which attain the worst-case focused risks are illustrated for α = 1
2
, 1, and 2. The nodes’ color represents the worst-case SSS at α (blue
= y, green = x). The targeted fixed agents are represented as squares and the unfixed agents as circles. Here 1
2
< αsys < 1. The proofs
establishing all worst-case graphs are detailed in Section V.
i.e. the worst-case risk is zero. By inflating the value of
the x-convention, the adversary is unable to induce any mis-
coordinating links or agents to play y. The technical results
needed for the proof are given in Section V.
B. Focused attacks and worst-case risk metric
An adversary is able to choose a strict subset of agents and
force them to commit to prescribed choices. This causes them
to act as fixed agents, or agents that do not update their choices
over time. One could consider this as allowing the adversary
an unlimited number of imposter nodes (instead of one) at
its dispatch to attach to each agent in the subset, thereby
solidifying their choices. This focused influence on a single
agent is stronger than the influence a broad attack has on a
single agent in the sense that the latter type does not require
the agent to commit to a choice - it merely incentivizes the
agent towards one particular choice.
Let Fx ⊂ N (Fy) be the set of fixed x (y) agents. We call
the fixed set F = (Fx, Fy), which satisfies Fx ∩ Fy = ∅ and
Fx ∪ Fy ⊂ N . We call F(G) the set of all feasible fixed sets
on a graph G ∈ GN . A fixed set F ∈ F(G) restricts the action
space to A(F ), where Ai(F ) = {x} ({y}) ∀i ∈ Fx (Fy) and
Ai(F ) = {x, y} ∀i /∈ F . We assume the adversary selects
at least one fixed agent. The strict subset assumption avoids
pathological cases (e.g. alternating x and y fixed nodes for an
entire line network yields an efficiency of zero).
The set of stochastically stable states given a fixed set F is
written as LLL(A(F ), {Uαi }i∈N ;G). However for brevity, we
will refer to it as LLL(A(F ), α;G). The induced efficiency is
Jf(α, F ;G) :=
mina∈LLL(A(F ),α;G)W (a)
maxa∈A(F )W (a)
, (13)
which is the ratio of the welfare induced by the worst-case
stable state to the optimal welfare given the fixed set F . The
risk faced by the system operator in choosing α is defined as
Rf(α, F ;G) := 1− Jf(α, F ;G) . (14)
Again, risk measures the distance from optimal efficiency
when choosing α. The fixed nodes here differ from the
imposter nodes in that they contribute to the true measured
welfare (3) in addition to modifying the SSS by restricting
the action set and influencing the decisions of their non-fixed
neighbors. Figure 1b provides an illustrative example of a
network with three fixed agents and one unfixed agent. The
extent to which the system is susceptible to focused attacks is
defined by the following worst-case risk metric.
Definition 2. The worst-case risk from focused attacks is given
by
R∗f (α) := max
N≥3
max
G∈GN
max
F∈F(G)
Rf(α, F ;G) . (15)
The quantity R∗f (α) is the cost metric that a system operator
wishes to reduce given uncertainty on the graph structure and
composition of fixed agents in the network.
Theorem 2. The worst-case risk from focused attacks is
R∗f (α) =

1− 1+α1+αsys , if α < αsys
0, if α = αsys
1− 1+αsys1+α , if α > αsys
. (16)
The technical results needed for the proof are given in
Section V. An illustration of this quantity as well as the graphs
that induce worst-case risk are portrayed in Figure 2b. We
observe the choice α = αsys recovers optimal efficiency for
any G ∈ GN and F ∈ F(G). In other words, by operating at
the system gain αsys, the system operator safeguards efficiency
from any focused attack. Furthermore, R∗f (α) monotonically
increases for α > αsys, approaching 1 in the limit α → ∞.
Intuitively, the risk in this regime comes from inflating the
benefit of the x convention, which can be harmful to system
efficiency when there are predominantly fixed y nodes in
the network. For α < αsys, R∗f (α) monotonically decreases.
The risk here stems from de-valuing the x convention, which
hurts efficiency when coordinating with fixed x nodes is more
valuable than coordinating with fixed y nodes.
C. Fundamental tradeoffs between risk and security
We describe the operator’s tradeoffs between the two worst-
case risk metrics. That is, given a level of security γ ∈ [0, 1]
is ensured on one worst-case risk, what is the minimum
achievable risk level of the other? These relations are direct
consequences of Theorems 1 and 2.
Remark 1. Before presenting the tradeoff relations, we first
observe that since R∗f (α) is decreasing on α < αsys and R
∗
b (α)
is decreasing in α, the operator should not select any gain
α < αsys, as it worsens both risk levels. Hence for the rest of
this paper, we only consider gains greater than αsys.
Corollary 1. Fix γf ∈ [0, 1). Suppose R∗f (α) ≤ γf for some
α. Then
R∗b (α) ≥ R∗b
(
1 + αsys
1− γf − 1
)
. (17)
Proof. From (16), R∗f (α) ≤ γf implies α ≤ 1+αsys1−γf − 1. Since
R∗b (α) is a decreasing function in α, we obtain the result. 
In words, as the security from worst-case focused attacks
improves (γf lowered), the risk from worst-case broad attacks
increases. A tradeoff relation also holds in the opposite direc-
tion.
Corollary 2. Fix γb ∈ [0, 1]. Suppose R∗b (α) ≤ γb for some
α. Suppose αsys ∈ Iksys for some ksys ∈ {1, 2, . . .}. Then
R∗f (α)

≥ 0 if γb ∈
[
1− ksysksys+1 11+αsys , 1
]
> R∗f
(
k
k+1
)
if γb ∈
[
1− kk+1 11+αsys , 1− k−1k 11+αsys
)
for k = ksys, ksys + 1, . . .
≥ R∗f (1) if γb = 1− 11+αsys
> R∗f
(
3
2
)
if γb ∈
[
0, 1− 11+αsys
)
(18)
If αsys ∈ [1, 3/2],
R∗f (α)
≥ 0 if γb ∈
[
1− 11+αsys , 1
]
> R∗f
(
3
2
)
if γb ∈
[
0, 1− 11+αsys
) (19)
If αsys > 32 , then R
∗
f (α) ≥ 0 for any γb.
Proof. All bounds are computed by finding infαR∗f (α) s.t.
R∗b (α) ≤ γb. The relations ≥ and > follow from the fact that
R∗f (α) is increasing in α > αsys, and depending on whether
R∗f can attain the resulting value. 
Here, as the security from worst-case broad attacks im-
proves (γb lowered), the risk from worst-case focused attacks
increases. Each of the broad risk levels can be attained for a
range of focused risks. An illustration of the attainable worst-
case risk levels is given in Fig. 3 (blue).
IV. RANDOMIZED OPERATOR STRATEGIES
In this section, we consider the scenario where the operator
randomizes over multiple gains. We present a definition and a
characterization of worst-case expected risks. We then identify
the risk-security tradeoffs available in the randomized gain
setting. We observe they significantly improve upon the deter-
ministic gain setting (Fig. 3). We then identify ways to further
improve these tradeoffs through different randomizations.
A. Worst-case expected risks
Suppose the operator selects a gain from the M distinct
values α = {αk}Mk=1 satisfying α1 < α2 < · · · < αM with
the probability distribution p = [p1, . . . , pM ]> ∈ ∆M . Here
we denote ∆M = {p ∈ RM+ :
∑M
j=1 pj = 1} as the set
of all M -dimensional probability vectors. In other words, the
operator employs the payoff gain αj with probability pj .
We consider the following natural definitions of expected
risks. Given a graph G ∈ GN and target set S ∈ T (G),
let Eα,p[Rb|S,G] :=
∑M
j=1 pjRb(αj , S;G) be the expected
adversarial risk of the operator’s strategy α,p. The worst-case
expected risk from broad attacks is defined as
E∗α,p[Rb] := max
N≥3
max
G∈GN
max
S∈T (G)
Eα,p[Rb|S,G]. (20)
Similarly, given a fixed set F ∈ F(G), let Eα,p[Rf|F,G] :=∑M
j=1 piRf(αj , F ;G) be the expected risk from focused at-
tacks. The worst-case expected risk from focused attacks is
defined as
E∗α,p[Rf] := max
N≥3
max
G∈GN
max
F∈F(G)
Eα,p[Rf|F,G]. (21)
Theorem 3. Suppose the operator randomizes with gains α =
{αk}Mk=1 according to p ∈ ∆M . Then the worst-case expected
broad risk is
E∗α,p[Rb] = max
k=1,...,M

 k∑
j=1
pj
R∗b (αk)
 . (22)
The worst-case expected focused risk is
E∗α,p[Rf] = max
k=1,...,M

 M∑
j=k
pj
R∗f (αk)
 . (23)
The proofs are given in Section VI. The characterization
of worst-case expected risk is a discounted weighting of a
deterministic worst-case risk level. This suggests that the risk
levels achievable by randomization can improve upon the risks
induced from a deterministic gain.
B. Risk tradeoffs under randomized operator strategies
Given a level of security γ ∈ [0, 1] is ensured on one ex-
pected worst-case metric, what is the the minimum achievable
risk level on the other? We find this can be calculated through
a linear program. We formalize these tradeoffs in the following
two statements, which are analogous to Corollaries 1 and 2.
Corollary 3. Fix γf ∈ [R∗f (α1), 1] and a set of gains α =
{αj}Mj=1. Suppose E∗α,p[Rf] ≤ γf for some p ∈ ∆M . Then
E∗α,p[Rb] ≥ vb(γf,α), (24)
where vb(γ,α) is the value of the following linear program.
vb(γf,α) = min
p′,v
v
s.t.
M∑
i=1
p′i = 1, pi ≥ 0 ∀i = 1, . . . ,M
v ∈ [0, 1]
ALP
[
p′
v
]

[
0M
γf1M
]
(25)
where  denotes elementwise ≤, 0M and 1M are column M -
vectors of zeros and ones respectively, and ALP is the 2M ×
(M + 1) matrix
ALP =

R∗b (α1) 0 · · · 0 −1
R∗b (α2) R
∗
b (α2) · · ·
...
...
...
. . . 0
R∗b (αM ) · · · · · · R∗b (αM ) −1
R∗f (α1) · · · · · · R∗f (α1) 0
0 R∗f (α2) · · · R∗f (α2)
...
...
. . .
...
0 · · · 0 R∗f (αM ) 0

. (26)
Moreover, vb(γf,α) is decreasing in γf.
Proof. We need to show equivalence between the linear pro-
gram (25) and the optimization problem
min
p′∈∆M
E∗α,p′ [Rb] subject to E∗α,p′ [Rf] ≤ γf. (27)
Let Ab(α) ∈ RM×M be the matrix defined by the upper
left block of (26) and Af(α) by the bottom left block.
From Theorem 3, we can express E∗α,p′ [Rb] as the max-
imum element of the M -vector Ab(α)p′, and similarly
E∗α,p′ [Rf] as the maximum element of Af(α)p′. Hence,
E∗α,p′ [Rf] ≤ γf is the linear constraint [Af(α)p′]i ≤ γ for
all i = 1, . . . ,M . The objective minp′∈∆M E∗α,p′ [Rb] itself
can be cast as a linear objective with linear constraints, i.e.
minp′∈∆M ,v∈[0,1] v s.t. [Ab(α)p
′]i ≤ v. Combining these two,
we obtain (25). The claim vb(γ,α) is decreasing in γ follows
as a consequence of the linear program (25). 
We note that a worst-case expected focused risk E∗α,p[Rf] <
R∗f (α1) is not attainable because α1 is the smallest gain it
mixes with. Hence, the linear program (25) is infeasible for
γf < R
∗
f (α1). The following tradeoff relation holds in the
opposite direction.
Fig. 3: Security-risk tradeoffs are depicted by the achievable worst-
case risk levels from deterministic gains (blue) and randomized gains
(red, green, black). The Pareto frontiers for three different randomized
strategies α1,α2 ∈ R5+, and α3 ∈ R300+ , are shown in increasing
order of improvement. The strategies α1 and α2 randomize over the
highest three broad risk levels in addition to the lowest two. The
strategy α3 randomizes over the highest 298 broad risk levels and
the lowest two. We chose the values as follows. For k = 1, 2, we
set αk1 = αsys, αkj = (1 − k) j−1j + k jj+1 ∈ Ij for j = 2, 3,
αk4 = 1+ k, and αk5 = 32 + k. We have set 1 = 0.5 and 2 = .01.
Hence, Par(α2) improves upon Par(α1) via Claim 1. For k = 3, we
set α31 = αsys, α3j = (1− 3) j−1j + 3 jj+1 ∈ Ij , j = 2, 3, . . . , 298,
α3299 = 1+ 3, and α35 = 32 + 3. Claim 2 ensures Par(α
3) improves
upon Par(α2). We chose 3 = .01 and αsys = 1/4.
Corollary 4. Fix γb ∈ [R∗b (αM ), 1] and a set of gains α =
{αj}Mj=1. Suppose E∗α,p[Rb] ≤ γb for some p ∈ ∆M . Then
E∗α,p[Rf] ≥ vf(γb,α), (28)
where vf(γb,α) is the value of the following linear program.
vf(γb,α) = min
p,v
v
s.t.
M∑
i=1
pi = 1, pi ≥ 0 ∀i = 1, . . . ,M
v ∈ [0, 1][
Af(α) −1M
Ab(α) 0M
] [
p
v
]

[
0M
γb1M
]
,
(29)
where Af(α) and Ab(α) are defined as the bottom and top
left blocks of (26), respectively. Furthermore, vf(γb,α) is
decreasing in γb.
We omit the proof as it is similar to that of Corollary 3.
Note a worst-case expected broad risk E∗α,p[Rb] < R∗b (αM )
is not attainable since αM is the highest gain it mixes with
- (29) is infeasible for γb < R∗b (αM ). Fig. 3 plots the best
achievable risk levels of three randomized operator strategies
(red, green, and black).
C. Improvement of risk tradeoffs
The tradeoff relations describe the best achievable level
on one risk metric given the other is subject to a security
constraint when the gains α are fixed. One way to improve
the achievable risks is to decrease the available gains.
Claim 1. Let α,α′ ∈ RM . Suppose αj ∈ Ikj (recall (12)),
j = 1, . . . ,M for some non-decreasing subsequence kj ≥ 1.
Let α′ satisfy α′j ∈ Ikj with α′j < αj . Then for all γb ∈
[R∗b (αM ), 1], vf(γb,α
′) ≤ vf(γb,α). Similarly, for all γf ∈
[R∗f (α1), 1], vb(γf,α
′) ≤ vb(γf,α).
Randomizing over additional gains can also improve the
achievable risks.
Claim 2. Suppose α ∈ RM and α′ ∈ RM ′ with M < M ′,
and assume α′ contains the elements of α. Then the assertion
of Claim 1 holds.
The proofs of the above two Claims follow directly from the
formulation of the LPs (25), (29), and hence we omit them.
Fig. 3 depicts the best achievable risk levels of three
randomized operator strategies of increasing improvement due
to Claims 1 and 2 (red, green, and black curves). In particular,
these plots constitute the Pareto frontier of all attainable
expected risks among distributions p given a fixed set of gains.
That is, for any α, we say a risk level
[
Eα,p[Rf]
Eα,p[Rb]
]
∈ R2
belongs to the frontier Par(α) if there does not exist a p′ 6= p
such that
[
Eα,p′ [Rf]
Eα,p′ [Rb]
]

[
Eα,p[Rf]
Eα,p[Rb]
]
. Within Par(α), the
operator can only improve upon one worst-case risk metric
by sacrificing performance on the other.
From Corollary 4, the frontier given gains α is the set of
points
Par(α) =
{[
vf(γb,α)
γb
]
∈ R2 : γb ∈ [R∗b (αM ), R∗b (α1)]
}
.
(30)
The parameter γb is upper bounded here by R∗b (α1) since any
risk level with Eα,p[Rb] > R∗b (α1) is unattainable under α.
Hence, the values vf(γb,α) and vf(R∗b (α1),α) are equivalent
for γb > R∗b (α1). The frontiers in Fig. 3 are generated by
numerically solving the linear program (29) for a finite grid
of points γb ∈ [R∗b (αM ), R∗b (α1)].
As we have seen, the transition from deterministic to ran-
domized gains ensures a reduction of risk levels. Randomizing
over only a few different gains substantially improves upon the
attainable deterministic worst-case risks. However, a detailed
quantification of such improvements remains a challenge due
to the high dimensionality of the model. In particular, we
have yet identified a “limit” frontier that could be obtained by
repeated modifications to the gain vector detailed by Claims
1 and 2.
V. PROOF OF THEOREMS 1 AND 2: DETERMINISTIC
WORST-CASE RISKS
In this section, we develop the technical results that charac-
terize the worst-case risk metrics R∗b (α) and R
∗
f (α) (Theorems
1 and 2). Before presenting the proofs, we first present some
preliminaries on potential games [25], which are essential to
calculating stochastically stable states. We then define relevant
notations for the forthcoming analysis.
A. Potential games
Graphical coordination games fall under the class of po-
tential games - games where individual utilities {Ui}i∈N
are aligned with a global objective, or potential function. A
game is a potential game if there exists a potential function
φ : A → R which satisfies
φ(ai, a−i)− φ(a′i, a−i) = Ui(ai, a−i)− Ui(a′i, a−i) (31)
for all i ∈ N , a ∈ A, and a′i 6= ai [25]. In potential
games, the set of stochastically stable states (6) are precisely
the action profiles that maximize the potential function [15],
[16]. Specifically, LLL(A, {Ui}i∈N ;G) = arg max
a∈A
φ(a). Our
analysis relies on characterizing a potential function for the
graphical coordination game in the presence of adversarial
influences. This allows us to compute stochastically stable
states in a straightforward manner.
B. Relevant notations for analysis
Any action profile a on a graph G = (N , E) ∈ GN
decomposes N into x and y-partitions. A node that belongs
to a y-partition (x-partition) has ai = y (x). The partitions are
enumerated {P1y , . . . ,Pkyy } and {P1x, . . . ,Pkxx }, are mutually
disjoint, and cover the graph. Each partition is a connected
subgraph of G. It is possible that kx = 0 with ky = 1 (when
a = ~y), kx = 1 with ky = 0 (when a = ~x), or ky, kx ≥ 1.
For any subset of nodes A,B ⊆ N , let us denote
e(A,B) := {(i, j) ∈ E : i ∈ A, j ∈ B} (32)
as the set of edges between A and B. We write Ac as the
complement of A. We extensively use the notation
Wα(E, a) :=
∑
(i,j)∈E
V α(ai, aj) (33)
as the welfare due to edge set E ⊆ E in action profile a,
where V α is of the form (1) with αsys replaced by α. For
compactness, we will denote W (E, a) as Wαsys(E, a) for the
local system welfare generated by the edges E. Our analysis
will also rely on the following mediant inequality.
Fact 1. Suppose ni ≥ 0 and di > 0 for each i = 1, . . . ,m ∈
N. Then ∑m
i=1 ni∑n
i=1 di
≥ min
i
ni
di
. (34)
We refer to the LHS above as the mediant sum of the nidi .
C. Characterization of R∗b : worst-case broad risk
To prove Theorem 1, we seek a pair (S,G) with G ∈ GN
of any size N ≥ 3 and S ∈ T (G), that minimizes efficiency
Jb(α, S;G) (maximizes risk Rb(α, S;G)). Our method to find
the minimizer is to show any (S,G) can be transformed into
a star network with a particular target set that has lower
efficiency, when α < 1. Thus, in this regime the search for
the worst-case graph reduces to the class of star networks of
arbitrary size. For α ≥ 1, structural properties allow us to
deduce the minimal efficiency.
The graphical coordination game defined by A = {x, y}N ,
perceived utilities {U˜αi }i∈N (7), target set S, and graph G falls
under the class of potential games [25]. A potential function
is given by
1
2
Wα(a) + (1 + α)
∑
i∈Sx
1(ai = x) +
∑
i∈Sy
1(ai = y) (35)
where
Wα(a) :=
∑
i∈N
Uαi (a). (36)
Hence, the stochastically stable states LLL(A, α, S;G) are
maximizers of (35). Suppose aˆ = arg min
a∈LLL(A,α,S;G)
W (a) is
the welfare-minimizing SSS inducing the partitions {Pkz }kzk=1,
z = x, y. We can express its efficiency from (8) as∑ky
k=1 |e(Pky ,Pky )|+ (1 + αsys)
∑kx
k=1 |e(Pkx ,Pkx )|
(1 + αsys)(
∑ky
k=1 |e(Pky ,N )|+
∑kx
k=1 |e(Pkx ,Pkx )|)
. (37)
Note the denominator is simply the number of edges in G
multiplied by 1+αsys. From (35), each y-partition Pky in aˆ
satisfies1
|Pky |+ |e(Pky ,Pky )| ≥ max
aPky
6=~yPky
Wα(e(Pky ,N ), (aPky , aˆ−Pky ))
+
∑
i∈Pky
1(ai = y). (CY)
In words, no subset of agents in Pky can deviate from y to
improve the collective perceived welfare of Pky . A similar
stability condition holds for each x-partition Pkx .
(1+α)
(|Pkx |+|e(Pkx ,Pkx )|) ≥
max
aPkx
6=~xPkx
Wα(e(P kx ,N ), (aPkx , aˆ−Pkx ))
+ (1 + α)
∑
i∈Pkx
1(ai = x) (CX)
The following result characterizes the threshold on α above
which any network is safeguarded from any imposter attack.
Lemma 1. Let N ≥ 3. Then α > NN−1 if and only if
min
G∈GN
min
S∈T (G)
Jb(α, S;G) = 1. (38)
Proof. (⇒) Let α > NN−1 . Suppose there is a pair (S,G) with
Jb(α,G, S) < 1. Then there must exist a y-partition Py ⊂ N .
From (CY),
|Py|+ |e(Py,Py)| ≥ (1+α)|e(Py,N )| > 2|e(Py,N )|. (39)
Since G is connected, |e(Py,Py)| ≥ |Py| − 1 and there is
at least one outgoing link from Py , i.e. |e(Py,Pcy)| ≥ 1.
Consequently, |e(Py,N )| ≥ |Py|, from which we obtain
|e(Py,N )|+ |e(Py,Py)| > 2|e(Py,N )|. (40)
1Since we are seeking worst-case pairs (S,G), we may consider any y-
partition as only having y imposters placed among its nodes. This is because
any x imposters that were placed in a resulting y-partition can be replaced
by y-imposters and retain stability. We reflect this generalization in (CY) and
(CX), where influence from only y (x) imposters is considered.
which is impossible.
(⇐) Assume minG∈GN minS∈T (G) Jb(α, S;G) = 1. Then
no y-partition can exist for any graph. In particular, (CY) is
violated for Py = N .
N + |E| < (1 + α)|E| ⇒ α > N|E| . (41)
Since |E| ≥ N − 1, we obtain α > NN−1 . 
We also deduce the following minimal efficiencies for any
graph when 1 ≤ α ≤ NN−1 .
Lemma 2. Suppose N ≥ 3. Then α ∈ [1, NN−1 ] if and only if
min
G∈GN
min
S∈T (G)
Jb(α, S;G) =
1
1 + αsys
. (42)
Proof. The (⇒) direction follows the same argument as
Lemma 1.
(⇐) The assumption implies the only y-partition that is
stabilizable is N . Then for any Py ⊂ N , (CY) is violated,
i.e.
|Py|+ |e(Py,Py)| < (1 + α)|e(Py,N )|. (43)
Since G is connected and there is at least one outgoing edge
from Py , we obtain
2|Py| − 1
|E| < 1 + α (44)
The above holds for any graph G = (N , E) and subset of
nodes Py ⊂ N . From the facts that |Py| ≤ N − 1 and |E| ≥
N − 1, we have α > N−2N−1 for any N ≥ 3. Consequently,
α ≥ 1 and Lemma 1 establishes that α ≤ NN−1 . 
The class of star graphs is central to the worst-case analysis
in the interval 0 < α < 1.
Definition 3. Let SN be the set of all (S,G) where G is the
star graph with N nodes, Sy contains the center node, and
Sx = N\Sy .
An immediate consequence of this definition is the leaf
nodes satisfy (CX). The efficiency is then proportional to the
fraction of leaf nodes that are stable to y, if any. Furthermore,
the stability condition (CY) of Py = Sy for members of SN
simplifies to
2|e(Py,Py)|+ 1 ≥ (1 + α)(N − 1). (45)
In other words, stability of the target set Sy as a y-partition
hinges on (CY) being satisfied for the selection aPy = ~x.
The following result reduces the search space for efficiency
minimizers to SN when α < 1.
Lemma 3. Suppose 0 < α < 1 and n ≥ 3. Consider any
(S,G) with G ∈ GN , S ∈ T (G). Then there is a (S′, G′) ∈
SN ′ such that Jb(α, S′;G′) ≤ Jb(α, S;G) for some N ′ ≥ N .
The idea of the proof is to construct a member of SN ′ by re-
casting the y and x-partitions of (S,G) as star subgraphs while
preserving the same number and type of edges, thus preserving
efficiency. Further efficiency reduction can be achieved by
converting excess x links into y links in this star configuration.
We provide the proof detailing the constructive procedure in
the Appendix. We now characterize the minimal efficiency for
the star graph of size N , J∗N (α) := min(G,S)∈SN Jb(α, S;G)
for α < 1.
Lemma 4. Suppose α < 1 and fix N ≥ 3. Then
J∗N (α) =
1
(1 + αsys)(N − 1)
⌈
(1 + α)(N − 1)− 1
2
⌉
. (46)
Proof. The goal is to find the smallest y-partition of the n star
that is still stabilizable under a gain α. This is written
J∗N (α) = min
Ny
1
1 + αsys
Ny
N − 1
s.t.
{
Ny ≤ N − 1 (size of y-partition)
2Ny + 1 ≥ (1 + α)(N − 1) (stability)
(47)
The smallest integer Ny that satisfies the constraints is⌈
(1+α)(N−1)−1
2
⌉
for α ∈ (0, 1).

Proof of Theorem 1. For α < 1, by Lemma 3, the worst-case
efficiency is
min
N≥3
min
(G,S)∈SN
Jb(α, S;G) = min
N≥3
J∗N (α). (48)
Using the formula of Lemma 4, we obtain the first entry in
(11). Lemma 2 asserts the minimal efficiency is 11+αsys for
α ∈ [1, 32 ] because the upper bound NN−1 is maximized at
N = 3 (for N ≥ 3). This gives the second entry in (11). Lastly,
Lemma 1 asserts the minimal efficiency is 1 for α > 32 . 
D. Characterization of R∗f : worst-case focused risk
Our approach for the proof of Theorem 2 differs from that
of R∗b . Instead of reducing the search of worst-case graphs,
we simply provide an upper bound on R∗f (α, F ;G) for any G
and fixed set F ∈ F(G), and show one can construct a graph
with fixed nodes that achieves it. .
We observe 12W
α(a) : A(F ) → R serves as a potential
function (recall (36)) for the game with restricted action set
A(F ) and utilities {Uαi }i∈N . Hence, the stochastically stable
states LLL(A(F ), α;G) are maximizers of 12Wα(a). Suppose
aˆ = arg min
a∈LLL(A(F ),α;G)
W (a) decomposes the graph into the x
and y-partitions {Pkz }kzk=1, z = x, y. We express its efficiency
(13) as∑ky
k=1 |e(Pky ,Pky )|+ (1 + αsys)
∑kx
k=1 |e(Pkx ,Pkx )|∑ky
k=1W
αsys(e(Pky ,N ), a∗) +
∑kx
k=1W
αsys(e(Pkx ,Pkx ), a∗)
(49)
where a∗ = arg max
a∈A(F )
W (a) is the welfare-maximizing action
profile. Similar to (CY), each y-partition Pky formed from aˆ
satisfies the stability condition
|e(Pky ,Pky )| ≥ max
aPky
6=~y
Wα(e(Pky ,N ), (aPky , aˆ−Pky )). (CYE)
To reduce cumbersome notation, it is understood the max is
taken over actions of unfixed nodes, aPky \F . Likewise, each
x-partition Pkx satisfies
(1 + α)|e(Pkx ,Pkx )| ≥ max
aPkx
6=~x
Wα(e(Pkx ,N ), (aPkx , aˆ−Pkx )).
(CXE)
The following lemma asserts that agents playing y in the SSS
under the gain α remain playing y under a lower gain α′ <
α. The result is crucial for establishing a lower bound on
efficiency for any graph G with arbitrary fixed set F ∈ F(G).
Lemma 5. Suppose α′ < α. Denote aˆ′ =
arg min
a∈LLL(A(F ),α′;G)
W (a) as the welfare-minimizing SSS
under α′. Then for any y-partition Py induced from α, aˆ′i = y
for all i ∈ Py\F .
Proof. Condition (CYE) asserts for all aPy 6= ~y that
Wα(e(Py,N ), (~yPy , aˆ−Py )) ≥Wα(e(Py,N ), (aPy , aˆPy )).
(50)
It also holds for all aPy 6= ~y and for any a−Py 6= aˆ−Py that
Wα(e(Py,N ), (~yPy , a−Py )) ≥Wα(e(Py,N ), (aPy , a−Py ))
(51)
because any y-links garnered in the RHS above by changing
aˆ−Py to a−Py also contribute to the LHS. In particular, the
above holds for a−Py = aˆ
′
−Py . Lowering the gain to α
′
preserves the above inequality as well, as it de-values x-links
garnered on the RHS. 
A dual statement holds - agents playing x in the SSS under
α remain so under a higher gain α′ > α.
Lemma 6. Suppose α′ > α. Then for any x-partition Px
induced from α, aˆ′i = x for all i ∈ Px\F .
We omit the proof for brevity, as it is analogous to the proof
of Lemma 5. We are now ready to prove Theorem 2.
Proof of Theorem 2. Consider any graph G ∈ GN with fixed
set F . Recall that efficiency is one for α = αsys. Thus, we
first consider α < αsys. Observe that
|e(Pky ,Pky )| ≥Wα(e(Py,N ), (a∗Py , aˆ−Py ))
= Wα(e(Py,N ), (a∗Py , a∗−Py ))
(52)
where the inequality is due to (CYE). The equality results
from Lemma 6 - the agents (/∈ Py) that neighbor any member
of Py remain playing x in a∗. We then obtain
|e(Pky ,Pky )|
W (e(Pky ,N ), a∗)
≥ 1 + α
1 + αsys
. (53)
The inequality results since the expressions of the numerator
and denominator garner the same edges for welfare. It occurs
with equality if and only if a∗i = x ∀i ∈ Pky \F . Applying
the mediant inequality (34) to (49), Jf(α, F ;G) ≥ 1+α1+αsys .
The case when α > αsys follows analogous arguments.
From Lemma 5, |e(Pky ,Pky )| = Wα(e(Pky ,Pky ), a∗). For x-
partitions,
(1+αsys)|e(Pkx ,Pkx )|
W (e(Pkx ,N ), a∗)
≥ 1+αsys
1+α
Wα(e(Pkx ,N ), a∗)
W (e(Pkx ,N ), a∗)
≥ 1+αsys
1+α
(54)
where the first inequality is from (CXE) and the second occurs
with equality if a∗i = y ∀i ∈ Pkx\F . From (34) and (49),
Jf(α, F ;G) ≥ 1+αsys1+α . 
We have just shown fundamental lower bounds on efficiency
for any graph with fixed agents. The bounds are tight as they
can be achieved for any gain α by arranging Nx fixed x and
Ny fixed y leaf nodes that influence a single unfixed agent in
the center of a star graph. If α < αsys, choosing NxNy =
1
1+α
gives the minimal efficiency 1+α1+αsys . If α > αsys, choosing
Nx
Ny
= 11+α gives the minimal efficiency
1+αsys
1+α . Note that if
α is rational, one could choose finite integers Ny, Nx that
achieve such ratios. Recall Figure 2b for illustrative examples.
However if it is irrational, they must be taken arbitrarily large
to better approximate the ratio.
VI. PROOF OF THEOREM 3: WORST-CASE RISKS UNDER
RANDOMIZED OPERATOR DESIGNS
Recall a randomized strategy consists of gains α = {αi}Mi=1
with distribution p ∈ ∆M . The gains are ordered αsys ≤
α1 < · · · < αM . To prove Theorem 3, we outline a few
technical Lemmas. The key insight is the expected efficiency
of any graph G can be expressed in the form
∑M
i=1 pisi, where
the coefficient si is a mediant sum over local efficiencies
of partitions in G when gain αi is used. The following two
mathematical facts are the basis of this insight.
Fact 2. Let νi < nidi ≤ 1 with ri ≥ 0 and ni, di > 0 for all
i = 1, . . . ,M . Then for all p ∈ ∆M ,
M∑
i=1
pisi ≥ 1 + min
i=1,...,M

 i∑
j=1
pj
 (νi − 1)
 (55)
where si :=
∑i−1
j=1 dj+
∑M
j=i nj∑M
j=1 dj
, i = 1, . . . ,M .
We provide a proof in the Appendix. The following dual
result follows directly.
Fact 3. For all p ∈ ∆M ,
M∑
i=1
pis
′
i ≥ 1 + min
i=1,...,M

 M∑
j=i
pj
 (νi − 1)
 (56)
where s′i :=
∑i
j=1 nj+
∑M
j=i dj∑M
j=1 dj
, i = 1, . . . ,M .
Proof. The proof follows similarly to Fact 2, where the indices
of the si coefficients are reversed. 
We will show for any (S,G) that Eα,p[Jb|S,G] = 1 −
Eα,p[Rb|S,G] can be expressed in the form
∑M
i=1 pisi from
the LHS of (55). The lower bounds establish worst-case ex-
pected efficiencies - and hence risks. The νi correspond to the
worst-case deterministic efficiencies J∗b (αi) = 1−R∗b (αi) of
the M gains and nidi to local efficiencies of selected partitions
in the graph. Fact 2 will be used to establish (22), and Fact 3
for (23) (Theorem 3). We now identify a structural property
required of worst-case graphs.
Lemma 7. A worst-case graph, i.e. a member of
arg min
G∈GN ,S∈T (G)
Eα,p[Jb|S,G], has no active x-links in α1.
Proof. Any active x-links in α1 remain so for all {αi}Mi=2.
The efficiency corresponding to each gain can be reduced in
the following manner. Delete all such x-links and associated
agents. For each mis-coordinating link between an x and y
agent that existed, replace with a single link to a newly created
isolated agent with an x-imposter attached. This preserves the
stochastically stable states of all other nodes while reducing
efficiency in each gain. 
Intuitively, a graph that has coordinating x nodes in each
gain α1, . . . , αM can be modified by removing these links,
resulting in a lower efficiency. We are now ready to prove
(22) (Theorem 3).
Proof of (22) (Theorem 3). Consider any graph
G = (N , E) ∈ GN and S ∈ T (G). Let us denote the
M (worst-case) stochastically stable states that correspond to
each gain αi with aˆi. Define for each k = 1, . . . ,M
P k = {n ∈ N : aˆin = y ∀i ≤ k, aˆin = x ∀i > k} (57)
as the set of nodes that play y in the SSS in α1, . . . , αk and
play x in αk+1, . . . , αM . Note that P k is possibly composed
of multiple y-partitions. Also note it is possible that P k = ∅
for all k > m¯ for some m¯ ∈ {2, . . . ,M − 1} - that is, aˆi = ~x
for all i > m¯. We first consider the case when P k 6= ∅ for
every k = 1, . . . ,M .
Let Qk := {n ∈ N : aˆkn = y} =
⋃M
i=k P
i. Denote P x :=
{n ∈ N : aˆ1n = x} = (Q1)c as the set of nodes stable to x
for all αi. Consider the gain αi with i ≤ k. Then the local
efficiency W (e(P
k,N ),aˆk)
W (e(Pk,N ),(a∗
Pk
,aˆk−Pk ))
of P k is
|e(P k, Qk+1)|+ |e(P k, P k)|
(1+αsys)(|e(P k, P k)|+|e(P k, P x)|+|e(P k, (Qk)c)|)
> J∗A(αi).
(58)
The inequality is due to Proposition 1. For gains αi with i > k,
the local efficiency of P k is
(1+αsys)(|e(P k, P k)|+|e(P k, P x)|+|e(P k, (Qk)c)|)
(1+αsys)(|e(P k, P k)|+|e(P k, P x)|+|e(P k, (Qk)c)|) = 1.
(59)
Hence, the overall system efficiency under gain αi is the
mediant sum of the local efficiencies of the P k. An application
of Fact 2 gives the result. The case when P k = ∅ for
k > m¯ ∈ {2, . . . ,M − 1} also follows directly from Fact
2. From the notation of Fact 2, nkdk = 1 for k > m¯. 
The details for the proof of (22) (Theorem 3) follow
analogous arguments pertaining to focused attacks. Recall for
a graph G ∈ Gn and restricted action set A, we denote
F = Fx ∪ Fy ⊂ N as its set of fixed nodes. Additionally, we
restrict attention to gains αi ≥ αsys, as these are not strictly
dominated in the risk curve. The following structural property
holds in a worst-case graph for focused risk.
Lemma 8. A worst-case graph, i.e., a member of
arg min
G∈GN ,F∈F(G)
Eα,p[Jf|F,G], has no active y-links in αM .
Additionally, a∗F c = ~y.
Proof. A graph that has active y-links in αM remain active
for all α1, . . . , αM−1. The efficiency corresponding to each
gain can be reduced by removing all such links and keeping
the border nodes as fixed y agents. This preserves the stability
properties of all other nodes. The claim a∗F c = ~y follows from
Lemma 5. 
We are now ready to prove (23) in Theorem 3.
Proof of (23) (Theorem 3). Consider any graph
G = (N , E) ∈ GN and fixed nodes F ∈ F(G). The
M stochastically stable states that correspond to each gain αi
are denoted aˆi. Define for each k = 1, . . . ,M
P k = {n ∈ F c : aˆin = x ∀i ≥ k, aˆin = y ∀i < k} (60)
as the set of unfixed nodes that play x in the SSS for
αk, . . . , αM and play y in α1, . . . , αk−1 . Note that it is
possible P k = ∅ for all k < m¯ for some m¯ ∈ {2, . . . ,M−1}.
That is, akF c = ~y for k = 1, . . . , m¯− 1. We first consider the
case when P k 6= ∅ for every k = 1, . . . ,M .
Let Qk = {n ∈ F c : aˆkn = y} =
⋃M
i=k P
i. Con-
sider the gain αi with i ≥ k. Then the local efficiency
W (e(Pk,N ),aˆk)
W (e(Pk,N ),(a∗
Pk
,aˆk−Pk ))
of P k is
(1 + αsys)(|e(P k, P k)|+|e(P k, (Qk−1)c)|+|e(P k, Fx)|)
|e(P k, P k)|+ |e(P k, Qk)|+ |e(P k, Fy)|
> J∗f (αi).
(61)
Here, we use the convention |e(P 1, (Q0)c)| = 0. For gains αi
with i < k, the local efficiency of P k is
|e(P k, P k)|+ |e(P k, Qk)|+ |e(P k, Fy)|
|e(P k, P k)|+ |e(P k, Qk)|+ |e(P k, Fy)| = 1. (62)
Hence the overall system efficiency under αi is the mediant
sum of the local efficiencies of the P k. An application of Fact
3 gives the result. The case when P k = ∅ for k > m¯ ∈
{2, . . . ,M − 1} also follows directly from Fact 3. 
VII. SUMMARY
In this paper, we framed graphical coordination games
as a distributed system subject to two types of adversarial
influences. The focus of our study concerned the performance
of a class of distributed algorithms against the associated
worst-case risks. We identified fundamental tradeoffs between
ensuring security against one type of risk and vulnerability to
the other, and vice versa. Furthermore, our analysis shows
randomized algorithmic designs significantly improves the
available tradeoffs. Our work highlights the design challenges
a system operator faces in maintaining the efficiency of
networked, distributed systems.
APPENDIX
Proof of Lemma 3:. This proof outlines a procedure to trans-
form any (S,G) into a star graph with lower efficiency if
α < 1. We split into two cases - either (S,G) induces a single
y-partition or more than one. First, assume (S,G) induces
a single y-partition Py . An illustration of the constructive
process is shown in Figure 4.
Construct a star subgraph Γy that has 1+|e(Py,Py)| nodes,
each having a y imposter attached. Call the center node iy .
Construct similar star configurations Γkx for each x-partition
Pkx . Call their center nodes ikx. Connect Γy to each Γkx with
a link between ikx and iy . If there are multiple edges between
Pkx and Py (|e(Pkx , (Pkx )c)| ≥ 2), create |e(Pkx , (Pkx )c)| − 1
new isolated nodes with a single x imposter attached, and
connect each to iy with a single link. At this point, Γy and
Γkx are stable y and x-partitions, and the isolated nodes are
stable playing x. We have obtained a graph of N ′ ≥ N nodes
with identical efficiency to (S,G) since the number and type
of edges are preserved.
We can further reduce efficiency if there are active x links,
i.e. if |e(Γkx,Γkx)| ≥ 1 for at least one Γkx. If there are none,
then the graph belongs to SN ′ and we are done. Otherwise for
each leaf node j ∈ Pkx , redirect the edge (j, ikx) to (j, iy), and
replace j’s x imposter with a y imposter. Call mx the total
number of such converted nodes. The resulting graph-target
pair (S′, G′) belongs to SN ′ . We claim the resulting (larger)
y-partition Γ′y is stable. For this claim to hold, (45) requires
that
2|e(Py,Py)|+ 2mx + 1 ≥ (1 + α)(|e(Py,N )|+mx). (63)
From the original Py , it holds that
|e(Py,Py)|+ |Py| ≥ (1 + α)|e(Py,N )|
⇒ 2|e(Py,Py)|+ 2mx + 1 > (1 + α)(|e(Py,N )|+mx)
(64)
due to |Py| ≤ 1 + |e(Py,Py)| and α < 1. All x-partitions in
(S′, G′) , now just a collection of single nodes connected to iy
with an x-imposter, are stable. The efficiency is less than the
original because active x-links increase efficiency more than
active y-links do. Hence,
Jb(α, S;G) > Jb(α, S
′;G′). (65)
Now, we consider the remaining case when (S,G) induces
ky > 1 y-partitions {Pky }kyk=1 and kx ≥ 1 x-partitions
{Pkx}kxk=1. Consider ky such star subgraphs {Γky}kyk=1 with cen-
ter nodes iky . Recast the x-partitions into similar star subgraphs
{Γkx}kxk=1 with center nodes ikx. We first connect each Γkx to
some Γjy with a single link (i
k
x, i
j
y) in any manner as long as
a link between the original Pkx and Pjy exists. For each excess
outgoing edge, we create an isolated node with an x-imposter
attached. Each isolated node is attached to a corresponding
iky such that the original number of outgoing edges for each
Pky is satisfied. At this point, there are k′ ≤ ky connected
components Gk in the construction, and the efficiency of this
construction is identical to the original. Lastly, we apply the
yy y
yy
x
x
x x
x
x
x
(G,S)
y
y
y
y y y
y
y
x
x
x
x
x
x x
x
x
x
Jb(α, S;G)
yy
y
y
y
y y
y y y
y
y
y
y
x x x x
Jb(α, S
′;G′) < Jb(α, S;G)
Fig. 4: An illustration of the constructive process (proof of Lemma 3) that generates a member (S′, G′) ∈ Sm from any graph (S,G) with
one y-partition, and α < 1. Here, the labels on each node indicate the type of imposter influence. Green (blue) nodes play x (y) in the
SSS. (Left) Start with an arbitrary graph-adversary pair (S,G). (Center) The partitions of (S,G) are re-cast as star subgraphs with the same
number of edges. When there is more than one edge between the y and an x-partition, new nodes are created for the excess outgoing edges.
This re-casting preserves the original efficiency Jb(α, S;G). (Right) The active x-links are converted into y-links by redirecting them to the
center of the y-partition. This results in a graph (S′, G′) ∈ Sm.
efficiency reduction procedure from before for each Gk to
obtain (S′k, G
′
k) ∈ Smk . From (37) and (34), we have
Jb(α, S;G) >
∑k′
k=1 |e(Γky ,Γky)|
(1 + αsys)
∑k′
k=1 |e(Γky ,N )|
≥ min
k=1,...,k′
Jb(α, S
′
k;G
′
k).
(66)

Proof of Lemma 2: Technical result for expected risks.
Let us define f(p) :=
∑M
i=1 pisi and fi(p) :=(∑k
j=1 pj
)
(νk − 1) + 1. The set of probability vectors
such that k = arg min
i=1,...,M
fi(p) can be written as the set
Vk := {p ∈ ∆M : fk(p) ≤ f`(p) ∀` 6= k}
=
⋂
6`=k
{
p ∈ ∆M :
∑k
j=1 pj∑`
j=1 pj
≥ 1− ν`
1− νk
}
.
(67)
Define λk =
∑k
j=1 dj∑k+1
j=1 dj
for each k = 1, . . . ,M − 1. With
some algebra, we can express each si as
si =
M−i+1∑
j=1
nj
dj
(1−λj−1)
M−1∏
k=j
λk
+
1− M−1∏
j=M−i+1
λj

(68)
Using the identities
∑M
k=1(1−λk−1)
(∏M−1
j=k λj
)
= 1 and∑`
k=1(1−λk−1)
(∏M−1
j=k λj
)
=
∏M−1
j=` λj for `=1, . . . ,M−
1, we obtain (omitting the algebraic steps)
f(p) =
M∑
i=1
(1−λi−1)
M−1∏
j=i
λj
(ni
di
− 1
)M−i+1∑
j=1
pj
+1

(69)
Now, suppose p ∈ Vk for k ∈ {1, . . . ,M}. Using (67) and
νi ≤ ni/di ≤ 1, we then have
f(p) ≥
M∑
i=1
λi−1
M−1∏
j=i
λj
 fk(p) = fk(p). (70)

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